One Man, One Voice! One People, One Language? by Von Busekist, Astrid
51
One Man, One Voice! One People, One Language?
Astrid von Busekist
And the Almighty came down to see the city and the tower 
which the sons of men had built.
And the Almighty said, “Behold, they are one people, and they 
all have the same language. And this is what they began to do, 
and now nothing which they purpose to do will be impossible 
for them.” “Come, let Us go down and there confuse their 
language, that they may not understand one another’s speech.” 
So the Almighty scattered them abroad from there over the 
face of the whole earth; and they stopped building the city. 
Therefore its name was called Babel, because there the 
Almighty confused the language of the whole earth; and from 
there the Almighty scattered them abroad over the face of the 
whole earth. (Genesis 11:1–9)
In language matters there are two understandings of democracy: For 
team A, a substantial democracy needs a lingua franca to ensure large 
political participation, upward mobility, and equality of opportunities. 
Team A is utilitarian and views language merely as a tool. Team B, in 
contrast, values diversity and considers language as culture: People 
should have access to a “full societal culture” (and a full set of 
opportunities) in their own language (Kymlicka 2001), or at least in 
the language of their choice. Equality and mobility are not achieved 
through a common language but through the citizens’ free choice to 
use their particular languages. In this essay I will discuss the virtue of 
each democratic genre in regard to participation, full citizenship, and 
fair representation. 
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Until recently, when social scientists looked at language, they 
focused almost exclusively on language identity (class or group 
identity) and language as an expression of a specific, unique culture, 
hence its intrinsic value regardless of its usefulness for communication. 
In line with Joshua Fishman’s pioneering work (1972), scholars were 
committed to language diversity because language was valued as 
such. Nonetheless, they also knew that language diversity generally 
hinders efficient political administration and that one of the classical 
sequences of nation building has been language rationalization, i.e., 
the imposition of one official, national language (von Busekist 2006, 
2009). Even postcolonial leaders have tried to adapt the wise principle 
of cujus regio, ejus lingua.1 
Until not long ago, and despite the ubiquity of language conflicts, 
normative literature has not paid much attention to language, and 
even less to the linguistic dimension of democracy. Post-Rawlsian 
political theory has publicized a wide range of culture and identity 
related topics, but has barely considered language. Neither liberals nor 
communitarians have really addressed language equity. It was only in 
the 1990s that scholars in comparative politics (Laitin 1994, 2000) 
1 [Whose realm, his language.] Language policy is an attempt to weigh on 
collective language choices by institutional means, to prescribe the public 
use of one (or more) language(s), to adopt language legislations (Laitin 
2000). Historically, creating, rationalizing, or maintaining one language 
is the classical (European) sequence of language policy, mostly congruent 
with nation building in the nineteenth century. Official languages are not 
always national languages (one official language can coexist with a set of 
national languages); sub-state national communities or groups with a strong 
regional identity may challenge the official language and make new language 
claims. Official and national language policies are only efficient when there 
is a compulsory education system, a wide interest in learning and using the 
official/national language, and some kind of reward for doing so (professional, 
symbolic)—the latter is particularly true for national language policies.
53
One Man, One Voice! One People, One Language?
and economics (Pool 1991b; Chiswick and Miller 1995; Grin 2004) 
began to look at language issues, generating sophisticated game theory 
models that, unfortunately, do not always apply to real world problems. 
The democrats among the social scientists, valuing deliberation and 
public debate and committed to freedom of choice, including the 
possibility of choosing the language we prefer to debate in, took a 
“deliberative turn” (Dryzec 1990), insisting on communication and 
deliberation rather than voting, but—until recently—somehow forgot 
to mention the precondition of a successful public debate: a common 
language. In recent years, shedding a new light on linguistic diversity 
(Kymlicka and Patten 2003) and linguistic justice (Van Parijs 2000a, 
2003, 2004), in a system dominated by powerful global languages 
such as English, rapidly led to a wider discussion on the usefulness 
and/or the threats of a common language, a lingua franca, in the EU, 
in multilingual societies, and sometimes even on a global level. 
One can link language claims to the theory and practice of 
democracy, to the citizens’ willingness to participate in political debate 
or engage in political action, in various manners. Our common purpose 
in this book is to understand citizen’s trust (politics) and distrust 
(antipolitics) of the political institutions and decision makers. My claim 
is that one of the variables that partially helps explain antipolitics, i.e., 
low levels of participation, auto-exclusion from the public sphere, 
protest vote, etc., is the lack of a common tool for sharing politically 
relevant matters: a common language (team A’s claim), in the sense of 
a common natural language (mother tongue), and metaphorically, in 
the sense of speaking the same language of values. 
Here, I will look only at the former sense and try to show that 
linguistically divided states are more vulnerable democracies and 
that a healthy debating democracy needs at least one common tool 
of communication. Empirical evidence seems to support that claim: 
Linguistic barriers are potential political barriers, and language is 
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most easily used as a “natural divider,” sometimes even as an alibi 
to veil more substantial political disagreements on welfare, social 
justice, redistribution, and so forth. 
One could of course reverse the claim and argue that 
acknowledgement of individual (or collective) claims to language 
diversity enhances the democratic quality of politics because the 
linguistic identity of every speaker or the linguistic boundaries of 
every community are fully and equally respected (team B’s claim). 
Kymlicka (2001) calls this natural form of participation “politics 
in the vernacular.” This argument has been well understood by 
multilingual federations—especially in the postcolonial era—to 
satisfy all linguistic parties (India, post-apartheid South Africa).
I will consider both sides in the following, draw on two 
examples, and refer to two different scales of citizen implication: 
the EU and Belgium. A common language as a necessary condition 
for a more substantial democracy has indeed been discussed within 
the European Union, inspired by what seems to be a linguistic fait 
accompli: hegemonic English. But the Europeans are contradictory. 
They encourage working knowledge in English, and to a lesser extent, 
in the classical EU and OECD languages (English plus French and 
German), but at the same time they celebrate language diversity. The 
Commission’s rule is “equal respect due to all cultures and languages.” 
The “European year of languages” (2001) has clearly illustrated the 
limits of sustainable diversity: The more languages one symbolically 
promotes, the more English is really spoken.
Large-scale and Small-scale Democracies
I will assume that the EU is a large-scale democracy or a “regional 
democracy” and test whether a common language would reduce what 
is commonly called the democratic deficit of the European Union. I 
will use data from the Eurobarometer surveys, namely the two special 
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issues on language (2001, 2006) and consider the following questions: 
Do we need a common language for a healthy democracy? Would 
social mobility and employability be enhanced if everyone spoke 
the same language? Do we need a lingua franca to discuss global 
concerns (such as environmental issues, pandemic diseases, global 
warming, etc.)? Is a common language required to create a more 
substantial democracy (local, national, global)? Would a common 
language avoid brain drain (if it were English for instance?) If we 
chose a natural language, is it fair—and under what conditions—that 
everybody learn it? Or should we opt for an artificial language?
On a much smaller scale, small-scale democracy Belgium shows 
that linguistic barriers are also “participation barriers”: historically, 
not knowing a language, or not mastering it well enough was a strong 
disincentive and a strong motivation to join nationalistic movements. 
Today Belgium is a federation divided into three communities, each 
of which is a micro-democracy on its own; the political culture and 
the citizens’ allegiance are bounded by linguistic frontiers. There 
is very little inter-regional or inter-community communication 
between Flanders and Wallonia, and there is less and less political 
communication between the Region Brussels-Capital and the rest of 
the francophone region in the south of the country, as their agendas 
do not overlap.
The country’s other community is practically a foreign 
people. It is rather difficult for a political system to keep 
functioning satisfactorily with such mutual ignorance 
and hence such lack of mutual understanding of the two 
halves of the country. (Dewachter 1996, 136)
How did these transformations come about? How did Belgium shift 
from a constitutional, French-speaking monarchy to a federal state 
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with three official languages, three cultural communities, and three 
distinct administrative regions? How did Belgium shift from free 
individual language choice to constraining territorial unilingualism 
with two strong nationalisms facing each other and preventing 
democratic vivre ensemble, social justice, and interregional economic 
solidarity? Why did Belgian’s consociational nationalisms, which 
were Belgium’s long-time trademark, become aggressive ethno-
cultural nationalisms rejecting peaceful negotiation and bargaining? 
The answer is: language.
Figure 1  Map of EU languages
Source: www.eurominority.eu/version/maps/map-european-languages.asp
Eurominority.eu - Mikael Bodlore-Penlaez - 2004
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Figure 2  Map of Belgium’s linguistic boundary
Source: www.ben-vautier.com/ethnisme/analyses/cartes/carte_belgique.html
Going back and forth from the large to the small scale, looking at 
different initiatives to resolve language issues may help us to conceive 
coordinate language policies: a summa divisio between the divisive 
power of linguistic differences and the virtue of multilingualism.
Love of Language or Language Utility?
There are two sociolinguistic truths: (a) learning a language is rewarded 
only if a sufficient number of other speakers engage in learning, but 
once a language reaches a tipping point, its spread is self-sufficient 
(Pool 1991a; Laitin 2000); (b) people learn languages upwards, from 
the smaller to the bigger language, from the economically dependent 
language to the economically independent language (de Swaan 2001). 
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That is why Zamenhof’s Esperanto has never become a widely spoken 
language: Esperanto has never reached its tipping point and accounts 
for less than 0.0005% speakers in the world (Piron 1989).2 Esperanto 
lacks motivation, anticipated profit, and, above all, Esperanto cannot 
count on an institution, a nation-state to promote it. And that is 
why people choose to learn useful languages despite their love of a 
language. In Belgium, people learn French and English in Flanders, 
English and Spanish in Wallonia. In the EU English is the most widely 
spoken language.3
Figure 3  The most useful languages
Source: Author’s adaptation of data from Eurobarometer 2006.
2 Ludwik Lazar Zamenhof (1859, Bialystok–1917 Warsaw) wrote his Lingvo 
Internacia de Doktore Espéranto in 1887. He also wrote the first Yiddish 
grammar in 1889.
3 Three-quarters of interviewed Hungarians, for instance, declared they 
would love to learn Italian and French (74%) or Italian (72%), but together
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In other words, we anticipate the probability of actually speaking the 
language we decide to learn, and we anticipate the benefit of our newly 
acquired competence: it is probability-sensitive learning (Van Parijs 
2006). The anticipated profitability of language training is a strong 
incentive and accounts for our learning commitments. But the choice 
of learning one specific language also depends on the perceptions and 
the expectations concerning other speakers’ choices: We would not 
learn a language we cannot share. 
That leads to another feature of language learning/sharing: the 
maximin principle. Borrowed and adapted from Rawl’s Justice 
as Fairness (2001),4 it simply means that in situations in which 
communication efficiency trumps every other consideration (language 
beauty, expressiveness), we maximize minimal linguistic competence 
and hence minimize exclusion, and according to Laponce (1984), a 
Canadian scholar, with a real risk of “killing languages by niceness”: 
Global languages such as English will always be preferred to “small” 
or “local” languages.
Two final distinctive features characterize languages. Languages 
are networks with positive externalities: Every new user/speaker 
enhances the benefit or the utility for all, and hence the value of the 
specific network or language, including global. Languages are non-
 these lovely languages account for less than five percent of the learning 
preferences (Hartkamp 2007). According to another sociolinguistic truth, 
all universal languages have at one point ceased to be universal. If our 
generation decides to adopt English as lingua franca and engages in 
public policies of language training that indeed spread English as the sole 
European common language, we oblige future generations, which will be 
unable to make the same linguistic choices we can. We might, in other 
words, create that tipping point ourselves.
4 “It tells us to identify the worst outcome of each available alternative and 
then to adopt the alternative whose worst outcome is better than the worst 
outcomes of all the other alternatives” (Rawls 2001, §28.1).
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excludable collective goods. Languages are networks because there 
is a strategic interaction between users of languages. Languages are 
networks much like transport or communication networks. People 
commit to such networks because they expect a benefit from doing 
so, and they are loyal as long as the next best option is too expensive 
or too time consuming. Joining a network enhances the global utility 
of that specific network. This benefit and global value are well known 
to economists as “external network effects”: Every newcomer adds 
value to the whole. Languages are also public goods, they are even 
hypercollective goods because languages are networks of a special 
kind; they are free goods, “open societies.” Even if there is an 
entrance fee (the time spent learning a new language), they are not 
created or owned by anyone in particular, they are non-excludable. 
It is impossible to exclude anyone from enjoying a collective good. 
No one has a veto on the survival of a language: languages need a 
significant amount of speakers, but the defection of one or some does 
not jeopardize a language. The efforts of one individual, conversely, 
are not sufficient to guarantee language maintenance: no one can 
create or salvage a language on his own. And, most important: A 
collective good does not diminish in value as new users join in. The 
specificity of languages as collective goods is that their value actually 
increases with each added speaker (de Swaan 2001, 38 ff.). Scholars 
have even shown that a 1% increase of English-speakers increases 
by 3.6% the people attracted to English in non-English–speaking 
countries (the figures are 2.2% for French and 1.8% for German) 
(Fidrmuc, Ginsburgh, and Weber 2004, 50).
One Demos, One Language?
Let’s start with the small scale. The debate about language is part of 
Belgium’s political culture and memory; it is routine, and as such it 
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holds a great virtue: simplification. Citizens can immediately identify 
with the issue at stake, and politicians have an easy access to a well-
embedded discourse. How did this come about?
Belgium was born in 1830 as a French-speaking constitutional 
monarchy, although more than half of the country (the Catholic north) 
spoke a variety of Flemish dialects without grammatical codification. 
The Flemish cultural-nationalist movement (like all other movements 
of the kind) rose in the mid nineteenth century, patriotic in its essence, 
never claiming secession or autonomy until the end of the twentieth 
century, and demanded equal recognition of Flemish culture and 
language. A unified Flemish language was created in the 1850s. After 
several political battles within the movement (between the Catholics 
and the liberals) and against the French speakers from Flanders (the 
fransquillons), official bilingualism was obtained in Flanders in 
1898. This was the first move to territorialize language policy. The 
Walloon movement came into being later in the nineteenth century, 
mainly as a reaction to Flemish nationalism. Socialist, anticlerical, 
supported by strong unions, it feared economic backlash because part 
of public employment was now linked to linguistic competence in 
both languages, and the Flemings were far more bilingual than the 
Walloons for whom it had never been useful, neither economically 
nor socially, to learn Flemish.
The scene was set. The next step was official unilingualism in 
Flanders (1932) and the constitutional recognition of Flemish as 
second official language (1935). Brussels remained and remains 
officially bilingual, although only 10–15% of its inhabitants are 
Flemish natives. Walloons hold they have a civic view of nationhood 
and encourage minority rights, whereas Flemings are supposed 
to have an ethnic and exclusive conception of the nation twinned 
with a preference for majority rule. The democratic “genre” in 
Wallonia is unitarian and monolingual, the Flemish preference goes 
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with a bilingual democracy, accommodating linguistic territories 
and preferences. Two nations, one state, and an officially bilingual 
capital. Brussels has tried for at least half a century to foster distinct 
“bruxellois” citizenship with no real success. The capital is a 
cosmopolitan European, French-speaking city, which could almost 
exist as a Stadtstaat, without the Belgian state.
Figure 4   Languages spoken in Brussels (2008)
Source: Author’s adaptation of data from Eurobarometer 2006.
The recognition of language sovereignty was thus intrinsically linked 
to the recognition of a distinct specific and autonomous cultural 
community. Language policy and the legitimacy of a sovereign 
language rule progressively became the core of most political 
conflicts. Although linguistic demands were accepted as part of a 
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regular political negotiation and mostly resolved—at least from 
a legal standpoint—they did not lose any of their strength. On the 
contrary, linguistic quarrels organize the public sphere in Belgium to 
this day, and the distrust vis-à-vis the other community is such that 
Belgium has recently spent more than a year without a government: 
the mediator appointed by the king (Yves Leterme) being incapable 
of submitting an agreed-upon list of representatives.
Paradoxically, the Belgians, who are apparently so poorly 
committed to their own state, are very fervent Europeans. Oddly enough, 
when interviewed, the Belgians are usually very strong advocates for 
equal respect to all languages. And Belgians score very highly on the 
language-competence scale. How are these elements linked?
Figure 5  Language training Belgium/EU25
Source: Author’s adaptation of EU data from Eurobarometer 2006.
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Figure 6  Variety and choice 
Source: Author’s adaptation of data from Eurobarometer 2006.
Figure 7   In how many languages are you able to converse fluently?
Source: Author’s adaptation of EU data from Eurobarometer 2006.
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Let’s look at the large scale. 
If we accept the idea that the EU is a large-scale democracy, a 
third wave democracy (Dahl and Tufte 1973) different in nature than 
“national” democracies, not only because of its size but also because 
of the modes of political participation and hence the proper way of 
organizing fair representation, we must admit that the overlapping 
electoral district “European Union” has a lot in common with our 
small-scale example Belgium. Reflecting on cosmopolitan democracy, 
David Held argues convincingly that:
National boundaries have traditionally demarcated the 
basis on which individuals are included and excluded 
from participation in decisions affecting their lives; but 
if many socio-economic processes, and the outcomes of 
decisions about them, stretch beyond national frontiers, 
then the implications of this are serious, not only for the 
categories of consent and legitimacy but for all the key 
ideas of democracy. At issue is the nature of constituency, 
the role of representation, and the proper form and scope 
of political participation.” (Archibugi, Held, and Kohler 
1998, 22)
Politics can only be conducted if citizens are able to participate 
significantly in their polity as “insiders”: “[T]he logic of moral 
equality … is best realized through democratic processes which bring 
insiders and outsiders together as transnational citizens with equal 
rights of participation” (Linklater 1998, 126). In my view, the state 
of “insiderness” depends on a variety of factors (trust, fairness, etc.), 
but also on a basic linguistic competence enabling participation. 
Language is one of these social resources that can either poison or 
cure like the Greek’s pharmakon, venom and remedy at the same 
66
Astrid von Busekist
time. Poison—because it is generally used as an exclusive identity 
device; cure—because it would suffice to retain one common 
language to communicate Europe-wide beyond national boundaries 
and communitarian tensions. Communitarian and or regionalistic 
tensions are formatted and determined by national, domestic politics 
and are not affected by large-scale politics. On the contrary, large-
scale politics often soothe domestic tensions. In his Citizenship and 
Social Class (1950), T. H. Marshall argued that the right to protection 
under the law is useless unless citizens could participate in the law-
making process; the right of participation is inadequate unless citizens 
have access to the social resources that make it possible for them 
to experience what would otherwise remain merely a formal right. 
Language is such a social resource.
Overlapping Consensus, Cosmopolitan Democracy, 
and Language Policy
[T]he very idea of consent through elections and the 
particular notion that the relevant constituencies of 
voluntary agreement are the communities of a bounded 
territory or a state, become problematic as soon as the 
issue of national, regional and global interconnectedness 
is considered and the nature of a so-called “relevant 
community” is contested. Whose consent is necessary and 
whose participation is justified in decisions concerning, 
for instance, AIDS or acid rain, or the use of non-
renewable resources, or the management of transnational 
economic flows? What is the relevant constituency: 
national, regional or international? To whom do decision 
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makers have to justify their decisions? To whom should 
they be accountable? (Held 1995, 18)
The question of the proper district and the proper constituency is 
relevant to the large scale and the small scale. Belgium could probably 
be rescued by an overlapping electoral district that would oblige 
politicians to set a common agenda for both nations in the Belgian 
case, and for all European member states in the case of the EU. In 
principle such a common district exists in the EU, but we all know 
that European electoral debates are conducted within the nation-states 
and following domestic agendas. The French and the Dutch “no” to 
the European Constitution was to a large extent a “no” to domestic 
policy.
But extending the public sphere to the Belgian federal state, 
agreeing to discuss principles regardless of language and language 
communities, and achieving an overlapping consensus through an 
overlapping electoral district is possible only if citizens accept the 
idea of treating language as a private matter instead of a public issue, 
and if they accept that fairness, welfare, and so on are not bound 
by linguistic frontiers. It would indeed suffice if one-third of the 
electoral body were trans-regional, trans-communitarian, within a 
single federal electoral district, to oblige the linguistic wings of the 
main parties to share an explicit common program. 
Let us now proceed the other way around. Instead of asking 
whether compromise could be achieved regardless of language (team 
A, language as a tool), let us assume that commitment to one’s language 
is a handicap such that no federal solution of the kind sketched above 
is possible (team B, language as intrinsic cultural value). Given that 
federal loyalty in Belgium is defined foremost in terms of linguistic 
loyalty, would it be possible to invent a new type of linguistic equity 
that satisfies all Belgians? Which solution would be the fairest one to 
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meet two contradictory and ultimately undecidable truths: language 
as a means of public communication, a tool, versus language as a 
substantive part of identity? In other words, is language truly a part 
of my specific identity (such as faith, for instance) that must be 
recognized as such (linguistic communitarianism5), or is language 
just a means to successfully interact, secondary and unimportant 
with regard to social justice (linguistic liberalism6). Liberal political 
regimes have to choose between very few institutional answers or 
5 The problem with the identity model is that it blends different kinds of 
arguments, normative and historical. The historical argument (the language 
situation yesterday) is used to implement language justice today [in May, 
2001]. Languages have disappeared in the course of history, but not all of 
them die a natural death; most languages have disappeared in the nation-
building process and the periphery has been forced to adopt the linguistic 
norms of the center. Nations indeed eat up languages and gradually destroy 
vernaculars. We now have to either (a) actively protect the languages 
that have escaped oblivion; (b) apply restorative justice and positively 
discriminate speakers of languages that have suffered, or (c) revitalize dead 
or dying languages, by all means—even illiberal ones (Skutnabb-Kangas 
and Phillipson 1994).
6 Two kinds of arguments intertwine: the quest for democracy and justice as 
well as the quest for language equity. The language equity claim may be 
put as follows: If my language is part of my specific culture and defines me 
(as a citizen and as an individual), then it is fair to share the state territory 
according to that specific identity. At least regionally, I should be able to 
practice my own language. But the claim can be reversed: The recognition 
of a specific culture, and hence of a specific language divides the state 
territorially, but foremost divides the community of citizens and upsets 
the equality principle. Citizens in this case are equal only if they speak 
the same idiom. The justice claim may be put as follows: Is language just 
any means of political communication or communion? Is language the sign 
and the symptom of my very specific “encumbered” identity that must be 
recognized as such or is language merely a general tool to communicate 
widely? Does it matter which language I speak to have my liberty fully 
recognized? 
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public policies.7 Both recognize linguistic liberty in the same way we 
recognize religious freedom, free speech, etc., but expel it from the 
public sphere. Liberty of language then belongs to the private sphere. 
Speak whatever you like in your homes, in your associations, and so 
on, the political sphere admits only one public language.
The other solution is to recognize language diversity by adapting 
the procedure and extending it to substantive minority rights. Philippe 
Van Parijs (2000b) suggests there are many scenarios but only one 
solution: territorial separation.8 There can be no viable democracy 
7 Either we state that minorities have the same rights as the majority—and 
we then need to shape a constitutional architecture to satisfy those rights—
or we admit that the law of the majority has to prevail. Majority rule does 
not exclude fair representation of minorities; liberalism has solved that 
part of the problem, as our representatives, although elected by part of the 
social body, speak in the name of all. The normative question for the state 
is then: How can a neutral, liberal state protect vulnerable languages if 
it does not decide to confer a specific value to a minority language (or a 
majority language: Flemish in Belgium, French in Canada)? Protection of 
a minority language also means protection of its speakers and the cultural 
patrimony of the community. In other words, the “Kymlicka claim”: since 
some communities, languages, and so on, are more vulnerable than others, 
the state has to protect them.
8 He rejects Mill’s solution, i.e., generalized unilingualism, for three 
reasons: Linguistic diversity is also protection of cultural diversity (the 
consequentiality long-term argument); linguistic shift is unfair to speakers 
who have to bear the cost of learning a new language (the justice short-term 
argument); the pragmatic argument of course is that no one believes in this 
scenario any longer. While 60% of the native speakers are Flemish, they 
produce 70% of the GNP. He also rejects generalized bilingualism, because 
of the vulnerability of one language vis-à-vis the other in a soft version 
of bilingualism where people would be able to choose their language 
freely and because of its prohibitive cost for the people and the state. He 
then rejects non-territorial separation, i.e., the Austro-Marxist version of 
personal federalism in which communities have full autonomy on cultural 
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in a multilingual society and no generous redistribution in a small 
open economy. The more decentralized redistributive powers, the 
tighter the economic constraints on redistribution. To achieve both 
democracy and redistribution, one paradoxically has to strengthen 
linguistic significance of borders while weakening their socio-
economic importance.9 He therefore pleads for territorial separation, 
in other words regional unilingualism.10 The practical side to this 
and linguistic matters as religious entities had in the Ottoman empire, for 
two reasons. First, because in a soft version, free membership probably 
benefits the stronger and economically more efficient communities and will 
lead to linguicide (parents will prefer to send their children to schools that 
are run in the socially more prestigious and economically more profitable 
language). Secondly, because our native language blessing is sheer luck. 
Our native tongue is not a matter of choice, but of luck or misfortune, and 
non-territorial separation may lead to apartheid.
9 For Ernest Gellner, nationalism can be defined as follows: social 
importance of cultural borders diminishes, political significance rises 
(Gellner 1983). The Van Parijs alternative is: linguistic importance of 
borders rises, while socio-economic significance diminishes (Van Parijs 
2000a).
10 All states “speak,” issue laws, and administer, language therefore cannot 
be benignly neglected as can, for instance, religion. In monolingual 
settings, the public sphere is entirely ruled by one language; in 
multilingual states, mostly federations, legislators have a choice 
between two principles: territoriality and personality. The first and most 
widespread principle (Belgium, Switzerland, Cameroon in its simplest 
form) is based on territorial rights: It legally recognizes a red-speaking 
territory, on the basis of a majority of red-speaking individuals. Variants 
are territorialized individual rights (Catalonia, South Tyrol), sectoral 
policies for minorities (Australia, the United States, Germany, Hungary), 
and territorial bilingualism for minorities (Estonia, Bosnia, Pakistan). 
Territoriality is usually associated with administrative bilingualism (civil 
servants speak all or part of the official languages) to ensure state-wide 
communication; it provides language stability and language security 
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argument is evident: Belgium is already regionally unilingual. His 
main proposal regarding language is to “gently foster a common 
forum of discussion which will increasingly be in the emerging first 
universal lingua franca: English.”11 
A 1999 survey among three age groups asked whether Belgians 
“Can [you] speak the other national language correctly?” The 
conclusions are disillusioning: In the Flemish mother tongue group, 
15% of the individuals in age group 55 or older speak French; 31% in 
(small languages are protected on their territory, relative language scales 
are relatively stable), but obliges all to speak the official language in 
its territory of reference. Territoriality generally leads to juxtaposed 
unilingualisms and may disrupt intercommunity communication as in 
Belgium. The personality principle on the other hand is best described 
by institutional multilingualism. The state acknowledges and recognizes 
individual language choices: Regardless of where I am in the territory, its 
administration has an obligation to answer in the language of my choice. 
Canada was ruled by this principle, but has abandoned it in part because 
of Quebec’s claim to protect French and the subsequent legislation (Bill 
101, 1977) making French the sole official language in the province. 
Canada is a pioneer in language matters. When the government voted 
for the creation of a new province for the Canadian Eskimos, Nunavut 
indeed adopted Inuktitut as its official language.
11 In Belgium, redistribution was achieved at the federal level, but without 
adequate recognition of the consequences of having two separate democratic 
spaces. The task is to fairly accommodate this separation, while preserving 
the sustainability of global solidarity: (1) the protection of the linguistic 
integrity of Flanders and Wallonia (though not of Brussels); (2) a reform of 
(key sectors of) Belgium's welfare state that combines a central collection 
of resources with capitation grants to the three regions, each in charge of 
the conception and management of its own health and education systems; 
(3) a reform of the electoral system that induces vote pooling across the 
linguistic border; (4) the gentle fostering of a common forum of discussion 
which will increasingly be in the emerging first universal lingua franca: 
English (Van Parijs 2004).
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the age group 35–54; astonishingly 35% in the age group 14–34. Only 
0.7% watch French TV. In the French mother tongue group, 19% of 
those age 55 or older group speak Flemish, 12% in the age group 35–
54; and 4% in the age group 14–34. The percentage watching French 
TV is ridiculously low (Van Parijs 2000b).
Figure 8   EU25 Lingua Franca (Eurobarometer 2006)
Source: Author’s adaptation of data from Eurobarometer 2006.
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Figure 9  Comparison Belgium/EU25
Source: Author’s adaptation of EU data from Eurobarometer 2006.
This common forum of discussion in one common language is 
under discussion on the large-scale side: the EU. The debate about 
the usefulness of a lingua franca comprises almost all the issues 
mentioned above. It is about identity, as we have to choose a 
single common language while respecting all the others. It is about 
deliberation and democratic procedure, as we have to commonly 
agree on a lingua franca; it would be unfair to choose a language 
without debating, especially if the choice is compelling once it has 
been made. It is about utility because the choice of a lingua franca is 
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outcome oriented: Global communication, employability, and social 
mobility are supposed to be enhanced by a common language, by 
English in particular, and brain drain would supposedly be avoided 
if Europe’s common language (especially within research, academia, 
and business) were English.
Figure 10  Language zones and brain drain 
Of the brain drain, 75% > English-speaking countries (USA, Canada, UK, Australia)
Source: Extrapolation from Ph. Van Parijs 2006.
A few words about history, namely, about the difference between 
imperial languages and a new lingua franca for Europe. Imperial 
“common” languages such as Latin or French differ from modern 
national languages which are the result of rationalizing and 
homogenizing policies. Imperial languages or languages of diplomacy 
were not considered as identity markers, and diglossia was the rule.
The center and the imperial or royal administrators spoke the high 
language, the vast majority spoke dialects, and the intermediary 
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powers were generally bilingual. Nation building and nationalism 
rationalized language communities around one single compelling 
national or official language to achieve nationwide literacy, 
employability, and communication (Gellner 1983; Laitin 2000).
Figure 11  Academia, language zones, brain drain
Source: Extrapolation from Ph. Van Parijs 2006.
National policies were strongly linked to democratization, at least in 
Western Europe, and literacy was a means to wide integration. That 
sequence does not fundamentally differ from the present situation 
in Europe: The need for horizontal communication (much like the 
horizontal solidarity within the nation-state, as opposed to the vertical 
organization of societies in the ancient settings) may rest on the 
same type of common literacy as in the nineteenth-century nation 
building process. But, should the adoption of a lingua franca follow 
the national model (a process of rationalizing around one official 
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language), or do we have to invent something else? What are the 
benefits of a common language? Do the economic/democratic benefits 
of a common language exceed the costs (material and symbolic) of 
learning a new language? Is it morally justifiable that we all learn the 
same language? Are the citizens of Europe willing to participate more 
if they can all speak, write, and understand the language of European 
politics, if they are able to share the language of those who govern? 
Would a common language be the condition for a European demos?
Figure 12  Income variance / English knowledge (Percent) 
Men n=1141
Women n=803
Value 100=no knowledge
Source: Extrapolation from Ph. Van Parijs 2006.
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Languages and Politics are Networks and 
Collective Goods
In his Words of the World, Abram de Swaan (2001) claims that an 
economic approach to languages, or at least an analogy between 
economic theory of collective goods and communication can help 
explain not only the utility and the communicative value of languages 
to speakers, but also the commitment to smaller and apparently less 
useful languages (via “collective cultural capital” accessible, for 
example, only through those specific languages), without having to 
rely on “identity” claims only while explaining linguistic preferences. 
Languages are tools; they are useful for connecting people. Certain 
languages enhance upward social mobility, link more people than 
others; some languages are more useful than others; and learning of 
some languages is more beneficial than others (de Swaan 2000). The 
world’s language constellation is a result of past or present power 
relations (linguistic normalization, rationalization, creation of official 
languages and killing dialects, etc.). A synoptic look at the world 
language system indeed shows a constellation, a hierarchical order, 
or a planetary system with a sun and its moons. A huge amount of 
languages (98%) is spoken by a very small percentage of mankind 
(10%): these are peripheral languages. They gravitate around about 
one hundred central languages (foremost national, written ones: 
“archive languages”), spoken by the vast majority of mankind. This 
second group is then connected—through its multilingual speakers—
to a dozen supercentral languages: Arabic, Chinese, French, English, 
Spanish, Swahili, Hindi, Japanese, Russian, Portuguese, and Malay, 
all (except Swahili) spoken by more than a hundred million speakers. 
The hypercentral language that holds the entire system is English: 
“the centre of the twelve solar systems” (de Swaan 2001, 31).
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Figure 13  The world’s language constellation
Source: Extrapolation from A. de Swaan 2001. 
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The next step is to look at individual speakers or groups of speakers, 
i.e., the combinations of micro-decisions to actually learn a language, 
practice a language, and maintain a language. The assumption here 
is that these decisions are not random. One can explain this through 
the above-mentioned characteristics of languages. The utility and 
the communication potential of one language are derived from the 
number of speakers, and namely, the multilingual speakers of one 
language or within one language repertoire. The advantage of this 
perspective in my sense is that it can account for language acquisition 
preferences, concerning “useful” languages, but it can also account 
for the desire for language maintenance (of vulnerable languages). 
But how are we to evaluate the economic or intellectual “value” of 
a language? In order to answer this heterodox question, de Swaan 
invents an indicator, the Q-value, to calculate the perceived value of a 
language within an overall constellation. 
The Q-value of a language is calculated through its prevalence and 
its centrality within the overall language constellation. The prevalence 
purports to be the proportion of native speakers in a particular 
repertoire. Using blue for example, the group of blue speakers is 
connected to other groups and speakers through their multilingual 
speakers, i.e., those who speak blue but also yellow, red, or white, 
hence the proportion of speakers that can directly be connected in a 
given repertoire. Centrality indicates the number of connections, or 
multilingual speakers, that link the languages in this repertoire with 
all others, hence the proportion of indirect connections. Using red as a 
non-native language, all blue, white, and yellow speakers who speak 
red are connected with each other.
English, for instance, has a poor prevalence in Europe (there are 
fewer British than Germans or Polish), but a very high centrality: Many 
more Europeans speak English than any other language. Does this mean 
that English should officially be adopted as the European lingua franca? 
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People learn English because they anticipate European language 
dynamics, the European language constellation with English at the 
center of its planetary language system. “Anticipated probability and 
profitability” or “opportunity sensitive learning” (Van Parijs 2004) 
produces a wide consensus concerning language training in English. 
In short, the Q-value is a rough and ready measure for the 
communication value of a language in a given constellation. A 
simpler measure (straight figures for the number of speakers) would 
do no justice to the dynamics of the constellation.12 
English is central, but would a European demos be able to function 
in English only?
Figure 14  Levels of exclusion 
Source: Extrapolated from Fidrmuc, Ginsburgh, and Weber 2004.
12 The Q-value also purports to reconstruct the value that speakers themselves 
attribute to language, an evaluation that guides their choices of foreign 
languages to learn (de Swaan 2001, 39ff.). But it doesn’t tell us whether 
language policies we ought to implement are fair.
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Exclusion by Language?
The answer is straightforward. The exclusion rates are far higher 
if English were the sole European language: 50% of the EU25 
population would be excluded. The situation would be even worse 
if French or German were linguae francae: 71% of the Europeans 
would not be able to participate at all. The solution is a common set 
of languages.
But if it were a combination, results are rather surprising. 
The French/English hypothesis would be the fairest one in EU15 
(maximum exclusion in Portugal with 59%); but in EU25 English/
German excludes a little less (38%), but the compared exclusion 
rates within the member states are far higher for the English/French 
combination than for the English/German combination (75% in 
Hungary vs. 84% for English/French) (Fidrmuc, Ginsburgh, and 
Weber 2004, 52ff.). The least exclusive combination is English/
French/German: 19% in EU 15, 26% in EU 25, 35% in anticipation 
of EU28.
Reasonable, fair, and cheap, the three-language combination 
seems to be the best solution. Cheap—because all European legal 
texts already exist in these languages; the OECD functions in these 
languages and most of the international organizations (the UN among 
others) have adopted them as working languages. Cheap—because 
translation costs are 64 million Euros per year and per member state 
(Malta trumps all other member states with 980 Euros per citizen) 
(Fidrmuc, Ginsburgh, and Weber 2004). Cheap—because the EU 
would avoid transportation costs (from Brussels to The Hague, 
Luxemburg, Strasbourg, etc.).
The question is: how? There are two ways of achieving this type 
of language coordination. The first and easiest one, and the most 
respectful one of national preferences, would be to offer the possibility 
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that member states invest the budget of European translation costs 
into language training (in the three classical languages). Within 
two generations, the language problem would be solved (Fidrmuc, 
Ginsburgh and Weber 2004).
Figure 15  English knowledge (by age groups, EU25)
Source: Author’s adaptation of data from Eurobarometer 2006.
The other solution, a bit more complicated to achieve, would be to 
copy the “Indian system.” 
In India, the postcolonial government has adopted a very flexible 
system, a 3 +/- 1 language constellation. There are two official 
languages, Hindi and English (3–1), the language of the member 
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state of the Indian federation (2 + 1 = 3), and the protected minority 
language within the state, if any (3 + 1).13 
Let’s try to adapt the Indian system to the EU. Native speakers 
other than English, French or German, learn English, French or 
German (1 + 3). Native English, French or German speakers learn the 
two other ones (3 – 1). This is obviously an unfair solution. 
Is there another way? Native speakers other than English, French 
or German learn two out of three classical languages (1 + 2 = 3) 
and native English, French or German speakers learn the two other 
classical languages (1 + 2 = 3). Despite the numbers, the second 
solution is as unfair as the first solution because native English, 
French or German speakers would know the three classical languages, 
whereas the others would only know two of them.
Language Democracy, Language Equity
The ideal match is the following: native speakers other 
than English, French or German, learn one classical and/
or one extra-European language (1 + 1 + 1 = 3), and native 
English, French or German speakers learn one or two classical 
ones, or one classical and one extra-European language 
(1 + 1 + 1 = 3). What is the advantage of the latter solution? Aside 
from the fair numbers, this solution respects, at least to a certain 
extent, the individual’s language choice and hence the “language 
training market” within Europe while at the same time satisfying 
the needs of a common set of known languages; it respects the 
dynamics of the language constellation (English is not a fait accompli 
anymore, English interacts dynamically with other languages); this 
solution shows that language coordination within the EU is possible; 
13 David Laitin, 1997. “The Cultural Identities of a European State.” Politics 
and Society 25/3: 277–302.
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and, maybe most important, this solution maintains extra-European 
connections: Individuals may choose extra-European languages, 
and according to the sociolinguistic truths we mentioned above, will 
probably choose those languages which most fit the probability of 
speaking them and the anticipated added value of knowing them. 
For Belgians (Figure 7) this system would not be a problem. English 
already is the best means of communication to bridge the gap between 
the two communities. Flemings still learn French (Walloons stopped 
learning Dutch after 1988 when the government decided to abolish 
compulsory learning of the other official language), the German-
speaking community in the Eastern part of the country (Figure 2) would 
be satisfied, and Brussels would continue to be a multilingual capital 
(Figure 4). Together with an overlapping electoral district/body, this 
system might even be able to save the country from breaking up.
Conclusion
I have tried to show, based on EU language data and on strong 
intuition, that a common set of languages could serve to foster a new 
type of transnational political debate encompassing all citizens, on the 
large (EU) and on the small scale (Belgium); such a common set of 
languages may eventually even counter antipolitics and build a new 
type of communion among citizens and between citizens and their 
representatives. 
Who is right: team A or team B? What is the best democratic genre? 
The one that postulates that language is a tool or the one that insists 
on language identity? The “Indian solution” allows avoiding answering 
such a question. It is flexible enough to accommodate the language 
lovers and those convinced by the utility of learning specific languages 
(Figure 12). A common language is not necessarily a common language 
of values, but I believe that the implication of transnational citizenship 
can only be achieved if people can share languages with their leaders. 
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